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German social insurance as a negative foil in Danish policy 
debates during the formative years of “social legislation”. 
 
Lars Schädler Andersen,
1
 Jørn Henrik Petersen & Klaus Petersen
2
 
 
 
I. The emergence of Acts on protection in case of old age, invalid-
ity, sickness and industrial accidents in Germany and Denmark 
 
During the 1880s Germany led the world into the age of social insurance by 
implementing sickness insurance in 1883,3 insurance in case of accidents in 
1884, and old age and invalidity insurance in 1889. Germany served as an 
innovator in three different, but interrelated policy areas.  
Denmark introduced old age relief independently from the poor law in 
1891,4 voluntary sickness insurance in 18925 and in 1898 a scheme on em-
                                                 
1 Department of History, International and Social Studies, Aalborg University, Fibig-
erstræde 5, 9220 Aalborg Ø, Denmark [la@ihis.aau.dk]. 
2 Centre for Welfare State Research, University of Southern Denmark, Campusvej 55, 
5230 Odense M, Denmark. [jhp@sam.sdu.dk; klaus.petersen@hist.sdu.dk]. This con-
tribution was presented at the NORDWEL seminar in Rome 10.-12. January 2010. It 
is a by-product of our project “Danish Welfare History” (“Dansk Velfærdshistorie”) to 
be published in six volumes over the period 2010-2014. The project is financed by 
Carlsbergfondet. 
3 The original idea was to adopt the accident insurance Act as the first step of the 
reform followed by sickness insurance. Since the former was based on new principles 
and institutions, whereas the latter relied on existing institutions accommodable to 
new views, the proposal on accident insurance met stronger opposition in the Reicht-
ag. The Act on sickness insurance, therefore, was adopted first (1883. 
4 The Act on Old Age Relief for deserving poor outside the poor law was innovative. 
Relief from the old was separated from the poor law to release deserving old from the 
stigma which followed from the legal effects (loss of civil and political rights) of the 
poor law. Separate treatment, however, was conditioned by the recipients’ fulfilling of 
a number of deservingness criteria. The benefits were financed from taxation. The 
criterion of entitlement was 60 years of age if the recipient had not collected poor 
relief within the previous 10 years. Benefits were means-tested in a discretionary 
manner, but were granted on a more permanent basis than were benefits from poor 
relief. 
5 The sickness insurance system was built on the existing network of private, self-
governing sickness funds. The first had seen the light of the day in the 1820s, but the 
breakthrough followed the liberal trade law (1862) which abolished the old guilds. In 
particular the 1880s witnessed strong growth as the number of funds in 1885 amount-
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ployers’ liability for accidents.6 Geographic proximity, cultural and linguistic 
similarities, and confrontation with similar problems suggest that Denmark 
drew lessons from Germany, but actually the Danish “system” – if one may 
speak about a system at all – represented an alternative to the German innova-
tion moving along a trajectory of its own. Did policy transfer not take place, or 
did it take place in a peculiar manner? 
 
II. Transnational diffusion, policy transfer and lesson-drawing 
 
Transnational policy transfer refers to the process by which knowledge of 
policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one nation/state 
(past or present) is used or not used in the development of policies, adminis-
trative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another nation/state (Dolowitz 
2000: 3; Dolowitz & Marsh 2000: 5), i.e. the process by which actors borrow 
policies developed in one setting to develop programmes and policies within 
another (Dolowitz & Marsh 1996: 357).  
Policy diffusion (Walker 1969; Clark 1985) can be seen as the more gen-
eral term with policy transfer as a more specific form, referring only to cases 
where conscious, external knowledge of a policy program or idea is utilized 
(possible in a domesticated form) or not in developing domestic policy 
(Newmark 2002) or cases in which external programs or ideas serve as a nega-
tive foil in domestic policy debates. Finally, “lesson drawing” (Rose 1991) is a 
subtype of policy transfer placed at the voluntary end of a continuum spanned 
by voluntary and coercive transfers (Dolowitz 2000). 
Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) generate a series of questions which are rele-
vant partly to explain the process of policy transfer as a dependent variable 
and partly to explain policy transfer as an explanatory, independent variable 
underlying policy outcomes: What motivates actors to engage in policy trans-
                                                                                                                     
ed to 1.000 – a doubling since 1870, and the number of members increased from 
12.000 in 1862 to 115.000 in 1893. The 1892-Act was based on voluntary member-
ship, but restricted to those of limited means. The funds were granted subsidies from 
the state, if they were approved – and approval implied some control and guiding 
supervision. The principle was help to self-help. 
6 The accident insurance system was based on employers’ liability to pay compensa-
tion. Approximately 90 % of liable employers insured their workers in private insur-
ance companies    
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fer, and how do supporters and opponents of various policies use lessons se-
lectively to gain advantage in the struggle to get their ideas accepted? Who are 
the key actors involved in the policy transfer process (elected officials, politi-
cal parties, bureaucrats/civil servants, pressure groups, policy entrepreneurs 
and experts, transnational corporations, think tanks, supra-national govern-
mental and non-governmental institutions and consultants)? Why is policy 
transferred? What is transferred (policy goals, policy content, policy instru-
ments or administrative techniques, policy programs, institutions, ideologies, 
ideas, attitudes and concepts, and negative lessons)? [According to the litera-
ture (Rose 1991: 4; Newmark 2002:154) negative lessons mean that observers 
learn what not to do from watching the perceived mistakes of others, or that an 
entity decides not to adopt a particular policy or behaviour change. The use of 
concrete and specific programs adopted in another state/nation as negative foil 
for domestic political debates seems to be neglected]. Are there different de-
grees of transfer (copying, emulation, combination (hybridization and synthe-
sis) and inspiration)? From where are lessons drawn (the international, the 
national or the local level)? What factors constrain or facilitate transfer? Past 
policies, structural and institutional factors, the political system’s political, 
bureaucratic and economic resources, and ideological similarities or differ-
ences can be decisive when actors look for lessons. Constraining factors, ob-
viously, mean that geographic propinquity is far from a sufficient condition 
for policy transfer.  
 
III. The object of possible policy transfer – the German “social 
insurance paradigm” as key concept 
 
It is outside the scope of this contribution to describe and analyse the decision 
processes prior to the German adoption of the “social insurance paradigm”, 
see Rothfels (1927), Kleeis (1928), Quandt (1938), Vogel (1951), Peters 
(1978), Zacher (1979), Tennstedt (1981a, 1981b), Zöllner (1981), Ritter 
(1983), and Hennock (1987, 2007).  
 It is reasonable to see the German “social insurance paradigm”7 (a pro-
gram and administrative techniques firmly ideologically anchored) as a key 
                                                 
7 In the literature of the day it is alternating termed “the German solution”, “the Ger-
man system” or “the German social insurance”. 
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concept which may give rise to policy transfer. The Danish economist and 
statistician Cordt Trap8 (1889a: 32) wrote: 
 
By Bismarck’s mighty authority Germany has succeeded in adopting 
Acts on workers’ insurance in case of sickness and accidents. Strongly 
influenced from Germany, other countries have either adopted or are 
working on similar measures.9 
 
Was this the case also in Denmark and how? 
The social insurance schemes adopted in Germany in the 1880s were 
based on a peculiar emphasis attributed to previous approaches to social pro-
tection which mirrored the German political and cultural legacy: 1) savings,10 
2) assistance by local entities or the state (public responsibility), 3) employers’ 
liability, 4) insurance, 5) paternalism and 6) cooperative self-help. Public re-
sponsibilities turned into arrangements set up by public law (and some public 
subsidies), employers’ liability into employer’s contributory payments, insur-
ance into compulsory insurance, paternalism into schemes exclusively di-
rected towards workers and employees and cooperative self-help into corpora-
tive administration (Zöllner 1981: 48). 
German social insurance – a remedy to solve the labour question and to 
frustrate the growing Social Democratic movement through material conces-
sions to the working class – was, despite differences in details of the three 
schemes adopted, characterised by 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 In 1889 (1859-1937) Trap was working in the Ministry of Finance. In 1896 he be-
came the successor of Marcus Rubin as Head of Copenhagen’s Statistical Office. He 
was intensively involved in the debates of the day on social issues. Trap (1892) is a 
thorough analysis of the thinking on protection in old age in a number of European 
countries. He was a frequent contributor to the Journal of the Economic Association. 
9 In Trap (1889b) he developed the content of the draft proposals and the eventually 
adopted German Act on insurance in case of invalidity and old age. 
10 Individual saving was praised in the German debates of the day, but apart from the 
established linkage between length and level of contributory payments on the one 
hand and level of benefits on the other in the invalidity- and old age insurance neither 
voluntary nor mandatory individual saving was implemented. This mirror the recogni-
tion that workers’ ability to save was low. 
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a) Compulsory insurance; 
b) Coverage exclusively for workers and employees with income below 
stipulated limits;11 
c) Partial financing through employers’ contributions; 
d) Partial financing through members’ contributions; 
e) State subsidies, but only in invalidity- and old age insurance; 
f) Linkage between length and level of contributory payments and level 
of benefits in case of invalidity and old age; 
g) Some funding in invalidity- and old age insurance; 
h) Corporative organisation and administration.12 
 
The German social historian Karl Thieme (1927) saw the idea of compulsory 
insurance as the decisive hallmark of the Bismarckian paradigm: 
 
Das entscheidende Neue aber ist an Bismarcks Gesetzgebung der staat-
liche Versicherungszwang, viel mehr als der teilweise Staatszuschuss, 
den man auf manchem Gebiet schon gekannt hatte … Staatlicher Zwang 
rein um des Vorteils der Gezwungenen selbst willen ist die moderne 
Welt erst durch Bismarck eingeführt worden und stellt dessen Staatsidee 
in eine merkwürdige Parallele zur katholischen, die ja auch heilsame 
Zwang allerdings nicht um das leiblichen, sondern nur um des seeli-
schen Privatwohles der Gezwungenen willen anerkannt. 
 
The labour question had been on the political agenda in Germany and Den-
mark for some years. By the social insurance reforms in the 1880s Germany 
took the lead by inventing compulsory, contributory and State-controlled in-
surance. Neighbouring Denmark followed in the 1890s. The peripheral, small 
Denmark, therefore, had the opportunity to import ideas and draw lessons 
partly from the preceding German debates and partly – during the 1880s – 
from knowledge about the proposals put forward and the schemes actually 
                                                 
11 Sickness insurance funds, however, were allowed (by corporative decision) to admit 
family members. 
12 In their final versions the three laws were very different from the ones the govern-
ment had originally placed before the Reichstag, not only in details but in fundamen-
tals, and they differed in many respects from Bismarck’s original intents.  The Reicht-
ag amendments certainly introduced significant differentials compared with the gov-
ernment proposals. These changes are outside the scope of this paper in which we 
focus on the basic principles of the German insurance paradigm and their reception in 
Danish debates. 
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adopted in Germany. The question, therefore, is which role the German social 
insurance paradigm as a key concept played in Danish debates and in decision 
processes concerning provision in case of old age, sickness and accidents 
from. This is the theme of sections V, VI and VII, but before we have to pre-
sent basic elements of the Danish political context. 
 
IV. The political context    
 
IV.a The political parties 
 
The last 35 years of the 19th century witnessed a mobilisation of large popula-
tion segments in modern mass parties.  
The Liberals, mainly supported by farmers, was formed as a party in 
1870 and gained majority in the Lower House in 1872. Even though the party 
frequently was split into different factions, and even though the party in gen-
eral was only lukewarmly engaged in promotion of social policies the primary 
and common objectives were to reduce tax burdens placed on farmers by re-
ducing public spending, to improve the conditions of farmhands with possible 
impact on the agricultural labour market in mind and/or to shift tax burdens to 
other groups – particularly the towns. The party was in principle – there were 
dissidents – carrying a liberal ideology which among other things implied a 
gradual turn towards support of the principle of help to self-help and re-
sistance against compulsory interventions. 
 The Right (the Conservatives) was the party representing the old aristoc-
racy, the landed interests, the higher placed civil servants and the better situat-
ed part of the urban population. The Right had a majority in the Upper House. 
The party was – at least in the years before the late 1880s – the social policy 
initiator, but generally sceptical regarding extensive state interventions. With-
out committing itself to the German paradigm the party shared basic aims with 
Bismarck’s endeavours. When Wilhelm II, German emperor, in July 1888 
visited Prime Minister Estrup,13 Estrup informed him that the primary objec-
                                                 
13 J.B.S. Estrup (1825-1913) was landed proprietor. He was actively involved in the 
elaboration of the 1866-Constitution giving the landed proprietors great influence. In 
1875 he was appointed as Prime Minister and served until 1894. He strongly opposed 
the idea of cabinet responsibility, and was the main cause of the “power struggle” in 
7 
tive of the Right was to defend the authority of the King against demands from 
the Liberals on cabinet responsibility, that the socialist had to be combated 
partly by repression partly by implementing measures to the advantage of the 
working class – not least because the former Liberals, the fathers of the 1849-
Constitution, had discontinued the old corporations and thus destroyed the 
institutions ensuring cohesion and mutual support among the workers. Finally, 
Estrup stressed Danish efforts to keep out of all European disputes and strug-
gles (Fink 1986, II: 115). He did not touch upon the explosive issue on 
Schleswig, cf. below, but so did the media. It provoked strong German reac-
tions, which at the next step led Danish conservative dailies underline that a 
proper friendship between Denmark and Germany was dependent on the re-
turn of the Danish part of Schleswig to Danish authority.14 The relation to 
Germany was tense, indeed. 
 The Social Democratic party – founded in 1871 – won representation in 
the Lower House in 1884. The party’s parliamentary strength was weak during 
the formative years of modern social policy – but the existence of the party 
and the trade union movement had an indirect impact, cf. below. 
 
IV.b Why were Danish initiatives “delayed”? The Constitutional strug-
gle  
 
The social policy initiatives of the 1890s resulted from protracted work in the 
form of parliamentary debates, legislative initiatives and the work of numer-
ous investigatory committees (Reports were published in 1862,15 1866,16 
1871,17 1874,18 1878,19 188720). One may wonder, therefore, why it had to last 
                                                                                                                     
the cloak of the Constitutional problem. Actually, he was not in favor of the reconcili-
ation in 1890/91, but was forced by other leading members of the Right to accept the 
new situation. Only reluctantly he was forced to resign as Prime Minister in 1894. 
14 Following the 1864-war Denmark had to cede the three duchesses Schleswig, Hol-
stein and Lauenburg to the King of Prussia and the Austrian emperor. The Danish 
monarchy was reduced to an insignificant European small state. 
15 The report (1862) investigated how to develop sickness funds in the wake of aboli-
tion of the guilds and other protective institutions. 
16 The report (1866) investigated promotion of associations aimed at mutual support in 
case of sickness and old age. 
17 The report (1871) investigated all matters pertaining to the poor relief system in-
cluding how to cope with resp. “deserving” and “undeserving” poor. 
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until the 1890s before social reforms actually were adopted. The explanation 
lies with “the constitutional struggle”.  
The 1866-Constitution – implemented in the wake of the loss of the three 
duchesses – ensured that the Right held a majority in the Upper House, where-
as the Liberals, as mentioned, held the majority in the Lower House. The Cab-
inet was not responsible to the Lower House, and there was no mechanism to 
settle conflicts between the two houses. “The constitutional struggle” and the 
issues related to defence dominated the political agenda to such an extent that 
positive reform measures were deadlocked for almost two decades during 
which the government governed on the basis of provisional Finance Acts not 
voted by the Lower House, and the Liberals responded by a policy of obstruc-
tion. 
 The deadlock was resolved in the 1890s primarily because of a change in 
agricultural opinion on the proper role of the state in societal life (Petersen 
1990).  The 1880s was characterised by an increasing gap between agricultural 
declining selling prices and increasing factor prices – the result being chang-
ing farmers’ attitude to the role of the state. To a growing extent they argued 
in favour of social reforms stemming migration out of the agricultural labour 
market. How could “the old country” and particular “life in the countryside” 
be made more attractive. “If it might be said that the social conditions in 
Denmark are the most happy, and if the workers might be convinced that 
America is not the land of milk and honey, one would be close to a solution” 
(Ugeskrift for Landmænd 1883, II: 296). New ideas on the state’s legitimate 
functions developed. The idea of the minimal state was rejected, and the need 
to distinguish between purposes best advanced by the state and purposes best 
encouraged by private initiative was emphasised.  
In 1890 the economic factors were added a number of political considera-
tions. By the election in January the Social Democrats won a constituency in 
the countryside, more radical groups of the Liberals gained ground in Copen-
                                                                                                                     
18 The report (1874) investigated the economic conditions of the working class in 
1872.  
19 The report (1878) was a thorough examination of all issues pertaining to the living 
conditions of the working class including protection in case of sickness, invalidity, old 
age etc. The committee put forward a great number of concrete proposals. 
20 The report (1887) investigated how to cope with protection in case of sickness and 
accidents at work.  
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hagen constituencies traditionally dominated by the Right, Berg’s “uncom-
promising group” of Liberals gained ground at the cost of Bojsen’s “moder-
ate” or “negotiating” Liberals and the Social Democrats pursued a more ag-
gressive policy vis-à-vis the Liberals. This bouillabaisse of economic and po-
litical factors gave powerful groups in the Right and the “negotiating” Liberals 
an impetus to seek reconciliation. 
 Moderate Liberals expressed the hope that the Right would contribute to 
narrow the gap between the two parties and emphasised that the Liberals 
would counteract all infringements of society’s natural, peaceful development 
whether the attack was rallied round the flag of the reaction or the internation-
al radicalism (Morgenbladet 2. May 1890). In reply the Right emphasised that 
despite differences of opinion “all good forces had to join in an effort to com-
bat currents at variance with the mother country” by promoting social reforms 
giving workers immediate and demonstrable goods, so that they felt protected 
against the evils of sickness, accidents and old age (Politiken 6. June 1890, 
Dagbladet 7. June 1890). Continuing the dialogue Bojsen – on behalf of the 
“negotiating Liberals” – said that ”all endeavours from an international, social 
stand to disturb the steady operations of enterprises and the good and peaceful 
relation between the domestic social classes” had to be counteracted. The lev-
er to obtain a happy future for the mother country had to be cooperation be-
tween the parties to develop a solution to the labour question (Morgenbladet 
1. and 2. July 1890). The views expressed were complying with the arguments 
of the agricultural journals that “the social reforming movement” had to com-
bat socialism in a practical and effective manner. Obviously, the way was 
paved for reconciliation between dominant groups in the Right and the “mod-
erate Liberals”. 
 
IV.c Attitudes towards Germany 
 
A free constitution was adopted in Denmark in 1849. During the 1850s the 
constitutional issue played an important role. The aim was to develop a com-
mon constitution for the Monarchy and the duchesses Holstein and Schleswig. 
Such a constitution was adopted in October 1855 restricting the 1849-
Constitution to matters of the monarchy only. It was opposed by Holstein, 
however, and in 1858 the common constitution was abolished as far as Hol-
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stein was concerned. The attention turned towards a solution including the 
monarchy and Schleswig. Holstein objected to all compromises, Russia was 
weakened and Prussia was developing towards being the strongest continental 
power. In March 1863 the Danish government announced that Holstein-
Lauenburg should be independent and only have the king in common with the 
Danish-Schleswig monarchy. In consequence a new constitution was adopted 
in November 1863. Despite pressure from friendly powers and despite the 
Prussian-Austrian threat to occupy Schleswig until the November constitution 
was cancelled, the Danish government did not react. The result was the 1864-
war the consequence of which was that Denmark had to cede the three duch-
esses Schleswig, Holstein and Lauenburg to the King of Prussia and the Aus-
trian emperor. The Danish monarchy was reduced to an insignificant European 
small State. 
 Following the defeat to Germany in 1864 Denmark became a nation state, 
but at the cost of having to give up part of national Denmark – the northern 
part of Schleswig. This unhappy national situation – described by the author 
Herman Bang as the “traumatic fever of Dybbøl” did last until the re-
unification in 1920. The 1864-catastrophe called forth a felt unity of nation 
and state as part of Danish popular understanding of Danish identity – a nation 
turned against the common enemy. The feeling of identity was also coloured 
by democratic sentiments originating from the 1849-Constitution. Democracy 
served as linkage between people/nation on the one hand and state on the oth-
er. Ideas on a peculiar Danish national character developed parallel with an 
image of Germany as an enemy, and the people as empowered and potentially 
community building entity – decisions to be made “bottom-up” and definitely 
not from above – a legacy from the enlightenment.  
 Among outstanding actors involved in developing social legislation one 
finds ideas on social reforms as a remedy to heal national wounds and to over-
come social and political cleavages of the day – reforms as a remedy to cause 
national unity across differences and conflicts, but framed “from below” as 
part of community building complying with Danish national character and 
identity. 
 The argument of this contribution is that a possible policy transfer has to 
been from these suggested perspectives. Germany and German thinking were 
met with scepticism. It does not mean, however, that German ideas were not 
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scrutinised in Denmark, but they did serve rather as a negative foil for efforts 
to develop a peculiar Danish trajectory firmly anchored in Danish traditions 
and legacies – demarcating Danes from Germans and uniting Danes on 
“something” they have in common. 
 
V. The compulsory nature of the paradigm in Danish debate 
 
Danish social policy theoreticians were well aware that the hallmark of the 
German paradigm was its compulsory nature. The peculiarity of the German 
social reform was its reliance on compulsion (Sørensen 1904), and this was 
the reason why the German system from the very beginning appeared as a 
consistent and organic whole marked by an inner harmony, the work of an 
architectural genius. The “blue print”-nature ensured application of a basic, 
common principle – compulsion, but that could on the other hand be an obsta-
cle to “the free growth of life, the organic processes which let institutions ap-
pear as budding on the societal body” – manifestly a Danish ideal arguably 
embodied in Danish identity. Whereas the German reform followed a master-
plan, the Danish counterpart had to develop piecewise and dependent on 
strongly varying political contexts making a conscious planning impossible 
and implying a complete lack of “system” (Westergaard 1915). The three 
basic acts of the 1890s, however, shared “the respect for individuals’ freedom” 
– an obvious (negative) allusion to the compulsory nature of the German para-
digm which to some extent served as negative foil for Danish thinking. 
 
V.a Protection in old age 
 
Ideas of compulsory membership of an old age insurance arrangement had 
played a role in previous Danish debates. The two decades following the 
adoption of the 1849-Constitution were the golden epoch of economic and 
political liberalism as well as individualism giving emphasis to self-esteem, 
individual foresight and voluntariness as concepts educating workers to bonus 
pater familias behaviour, but the 1870s witnessed encounters between the 
time-honoured principle of voluntariness and what was termed “the new com-
pulsory idea”.  
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Not least the medical officer of health and social economist Fr. Krebs21 
(1874, 1875, 1876), who had been an active member of the 1869-Commission 
on the Poor Law and who played an important role in the 1875-Commission 
on the conditions of the working class, argued in favour of a system based on 
compulsion. “The state must not frighten away from compulsion because of 
stilted phraseology about intervention in personal freedom, when the aim is to 
ensure people’s economic independency” (Krebs 1874). Despite these strong 
words he accepted the idea of compulsion only reluctantly. In principle one 
had to rely on voluntariness to maintain self-respect, ensure individual respon-
sibility, and to develop the will to provide for oneself.    
The majority of the Commission rejected compulsion (Ministerialtidende 
1878, B.1 in particular: 767-81) as “weakening the character”. The state was 
not to be understood as “a provider, but as a protector of individuals’ freedom 
and rights” (Nielsen 1874: 17). The commission, however, suggested a possi-
ble compromise: a habit-forming compulsory insurance covering only young 
people. 
 To shed light on the parliamentary attitudes towards this possibility a 
private bill based on compulsory insurance for the young of age 15-22 was put 
forward in the parliamentary session 1881/82, and reintroduced in the follow-
ing session. The majority of the parliamentary commission (Rigsdagstidende 
1881/82, B: 1397-1408) rejected compulsion as being at variance with the 
existing “order of society”, as weakening local self-help associations, making 
administration difficult, reducing the incentives to save, intervening in rights 
of disposal and restraining the development of existing institutions. Education 
towards independence and self-preservation had to be based on voluntariness. 
Economic incentives might be a proper remedy, but compulsion was excluded. 
 The argument on compulsion as being at variance with the “order of soci-
ety” was probably influenced from the extensive reporting in the Journal of 
the Economic Association (Nationaløkonomisk Tidsskrift) on the writings of 
the German economist Lujo Brentano – opponent of compulsory insurance 
                                                 
21 As early as 1869 – two years prior to the foundation of the Social Democratic Party 
– Krebs (1814-1881) (1869) wrote about the coming workers movement and urged 
efforts to improve the conditions of workers. In Krebs (1872) he argued that a strong 
legislation to the advantage of the workers in combination with their own associations 
would remove the basis of socialism. He was member of the Poor Law Commission 
appointed in 1869 and the 1875-Commission on the conditions of the working class. 
13 
(Ritter 1983: 121). The Journal reported intensively on German debates and 
scholarly work, but in a selective manner, see for example Petersen-Studnitz 
(1878, 1879, 1881) who was the secretary of the Journal and the Association, 
and who wrote numerous reviews and introductions on various subjects.22 
Brentano’s arguments on compulsion as being at variance with the existing 
order of society corresponded with dominant views among Danish econo-
mists.23 The selective presentation of the German debate is also mirrored by 
professor N.C. Frederiksen’s24 (1873) extensive review of Ludwig Bamberger 
(1873). Bamberger was with Eugen Richter leading liberal spokesmen for the 
German Liberals’ ideological combat against the idea of compulsory social 
insurance. When in 1882 an unknown author reviewed Schäffle (1882) the 
evaluation was far from neutral. Schäffle’s work was called a piece of petti-
fogging in favour of Bismarck’s plans on compulsory insurance, a work writ-
ten by the German Reich Chancellor’s social political advisor rather the schol-
ar Schäffle. 
 The proposers of the 1881/82 bill denied that their proposal was an inter-
vention in individual freedom, because compulsion covering all citizens was 
not compulsion in any other sense than was tax liability. This argument was   
seized by the opponents seeing it as a break with insurance thinking at all. If 
contributions were identical to taxes there were no reasons to establish a link-
age between the contributory payments and the later benefit level.  
Voices were also raised against partial financing by employers because it 
ran contrary to the interests of the dominant political group: the farmers. To 
                                                 
22 In Petersen-Studnitz (1846-1935) (1878, 1879) he reviewed Lujo Brentano (1879) 
and in Petersen-Studnitz (1881) he reviewed Brantano (1881). Alexis Petersen-
Studnitz was particularly interested in social issues and he always emphasised British 
liberal economics as superior in this context to German “socialism of the chair”. He 
was an opponent to “socialism of the chair” and over the years he developed into a 
still more eager spokesman for the ideas of classical, liberal economics.   
23 It was no mere coincidence that Bramsen (1847-1914) (1889c) in his discussion of 
the German protective laws gave his attention to Brentano’s works, for which he was 
criticized by Schovelin (1889) reviewing Bramsen’s work, cf. below. 
24 N.C. Frederiksen (1840-1905) was appointed professor at the Copenhagen Universi-
ty in 1867. He left Denmark in 1877 to travel abroad. In his textbooks (Frederiksen 
1870, 1874) he strongly argued for “liberal” economics in Bastiat’s sense, a position 
he maintained during his life. He was member of the Lower House 1866-1877 affiliat-
ed with the so called “Party of the Middle” manoeuvring between the Right and the 
Liberals. When the party was dissolved in 1876 he drew nearer to the Liberals.  
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some extent it may be argued that compulsion, insurance and employer contri-
butions were rejected as remedies in relation to security in old age even before 
the adoption of the first Act in the German reform complex. A development 
towards tax financed old age relief had started. This mirrored also the under-
standing that workers’ ability to pay possibly made a voluntary sickness insur-
ance partly based on individual premium payments possible, but it was prob-
lematic to extend contributory payments to cover protection also in old age. 
Of course, the idea of compulsory insurance appeared on the political 
agenda when the German Act on invalidity and old age insurance was adopted 
in 1889, but again it was turned down because the state had no right to inter-
vene in the free disposals of individuals – even though voluntariness was in-
compatible with the desire to ensure universal coverage, see e.g. Bramsen 25 
(1889a, 1889b, 1890).  
Cordt Trap (1889a, 1889b) presented a balanced survey of the German 
1887-report and the Act actually implemented in 1889 accompanied by a sur-
vey on the development in England, Italy, Denmark, France and Sweden. In a 
neutral manner he discussed the basic choices to be made in elaborating a 
scheme protecting individuals in old age. His point of departure was the 
recognition that during the period in which the liberal thought governed sci-
ence compulsory insurance or subsidies from the public were excluded, but 
now modern science acknowledged the state as the “natural representative” of 
society carrying an obligation to improve the condition of life among the low-
er classes to the extent possible, and solutions to the implied problem were not 
to be deduced from principles, but by balancing all reasons. This view was 
what governed his un-ideological presentation. 
Obviously, the adopted Danish Act was very different from its German 
counterpart. This is due to several circumstances. Whereas in the 1880s Ger-
                                                 
25 Ludvig Bramsen (1847-1914) was educated within insurance and after his fathers 
death in 1886 he became managing director in New Danish Fire Insurance Company. 
During his education abroad he got interested in insurance of those of limited means. 
He was seen as a social policy expert. In 1892 he was elected to the Lower House. He 
represented the Right, but behaved as a rather independent politician frequently coop-
erating also with politicians of other parties. He wrote extensively on social matters 
and influenced in particular the Act on insurance in case of accidents. During the 
period 1899-1901 he served as Minister of the Interior. In 1903 he was appointed 
member of the new Commission on insurance in case of invalidity and old age. 
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man social policy was part of a government agenda among other objectives 
aiming at enhancing the power of the Imperial government, Danish old age 
pensions were part of the endeavours to remove categories of deserving poor 
from the operation of the poor law, i.e. to exclude particular risks from the 
poor law. And the Act on relief in old age as well as the Act on approved 
sickness funds (insurance in case of sickness) served as catalysts to pave the 
way for a reconciliation between the Right and the Liberals, and to improve 
the conditions of the workers not least in the countryside in order to improve 
also the conditions of the farmers. The political context, therefore, was fun-
damentally different. The German efforts were initiated from above so as to 
enhance the role of the recently established Empire, whereas in Denmark it 
was strongly emphasized that the development ought to be governed “from 
below”, i.e. take the existing institutional set-up as the point of departure, thus 
ensuring continuity. German pensions did not always ensure an income ade-
quate for subsistence and had in some cases to be supplemented by poor law 
relief, while in Denmark the objective was to remove people of old age from 
poor relief, i.e. the two schemes – poor law relief and relief in old age – were 
seen as alternatives. From some views it is reasonable to see Danish relief in 
old age as basically a reform of the poor law separating identified group from 
the genuine poor law. The Danish Act, therefore, made use of means-testing 
and demanded the recipient to fulfil a number of “deservingness criteria”. 
Such use of means-testing and deservingness was never contemplated by Bis-
marck, the policy of whom was primarily motivated by political – not moral – 
considerations. 
 
V.b Insurance in case of sickness 
 
One year after the German adoption of social insurance in case of sickness the 
prominent representative of the Danish sickness insurance funds, the vicar V. 
Munck26 (1894) wrote on the future of these. He noted that most Danes would 
                                                 
26 Munck (1833-1913) was theologian and served first as vicar in Flensburg. After the 
1864-war he became vicar in Copenhagen where he was engaged in philanthropy 
organised by the church, see Munck (1867, 1868). In 1875 he moved as a vicar to 
Herlufsholm. He was deeply involved in developing the sickness insurance funds, and 
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agree that the “strict machinery” in Germany was disgusting. Coercive goods 
were not acknowledged as goods and “coercion from above” had to give way 
for the population’s firm belief in the beneficial concern of the system as such 
paving the way for its further development by voluntary decisions of the indi-
vidual. The firm belief’s “silent power” would voluntarily call forth the suffi-
cient personal motivation and vigour as well as sufficient means. Pure self-
help might well be reduced, but voluntariness and self-management had to be 
maintained. 
 In July 1885 a commission on workers protection in case of accidents 
was appointed, but in November the mandate was extended to cover also the 
problems of the sickness insurance funds. The Minister of the Interior for-
warded a proposal worked out by the medical officer of health T.M. Trautner27 
on “preferential treatment of sickness insurance funds approved by the state”, 
see also Trautner (1886). The commission, see Betænkning (1887), rejected 
all ideas on compulsion as being at variance with the development, a disturb-
ing intervention in societal life, societal consciousness and societal institu-
tions. Voluntariness had to be maintained, but if the project was to succeed 
support from public authorities (subsidies) had to be implemented – the work-
ers were unable to carry the total financial burden themselves. The basic struc-
ture had to be developed by a harmonious interplay between voluntariness, 
approval and supervision by the state, and subsidies from the state.  
At the general meeting of the Right in 1888 (Beretning 1889), the Ger-
man model was described as mirroring “a lot of duress and much art”. The 
first bill on approved sickness insurance funds (Rigsdagstidende 1888/89, A: 
1567-1604) underlined the need to promote “the workers’ free associations”. 
In the light of the previous debates and the German decisions the bill rejected 
all uses of compulsion. The institution of sickness insurance funds was devel-
oping, and compulsion would counteract the benefits achieved: The moral 
development of the population, the self-esteem of those of limited means and 
their courage to ensure their own existence. Even though voluntariness meant 
                                                                                                                     
worked in particular for developing a close cooperation between the local funds. It is 
reasonable to see him as an expert on sickness insurance. 
27 Trautner (1838-1903) was strongly interested in social questions, and – supported 
by the government – he travelled abroad to study the work of sickness funds in other 
countries. 
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that some people were not covered, support from the public implied an incen-
tive to move in the proper direction. The development had to continue in a 
“natural manner” ensuring maximum continuity. The principle had to be help 
to individuals’ self-help conditioned by approval and supervision. 
 From the late 1880s the debate was marked by frequent references to “the 
British versus the German trajectory”, even though it was recognized that it 
looked as if Denmark was going to enter a trajectory of its own. Comparisons 
of the German and the British trajectory, however, had been presented in 
Denmark as early as in the 1870s. Reviewing some Danish scholarly works 
published in 1875 and 1876 the reviewer C28 (Frederiksen 1877) used the title 
“Lack of Freedom and Germanism in the political Economy”. The weakness 
of German social science was, he wrote, that the scholars in a most odd man-
ner had “fallen in love with the State”. Like German civil servants they idolize 
the State. Even though he had some positive characteristics of Albert Schäffle 
and Adolph Wagner, he criticised their throwing into relief of the State at the 
cost of individuals, and their criticism of “the Manchester teaching” in general 
was described as completely unjustified. The three editors of the Journal of the 
Economic Association, the economic professors at the University of Copenha-
gen N.C. Frederiksen, W. Scharling29 and V. Falbe-Hansen30 were all lecturing 
and arguing within that frame of liberal economic teaching that dominated 
Denmark at the time, and they strongly influenced the selective reporting of 
the journal on German economic thinking. 
                                                 
28 The editors of the Journal of the Danish Economic Association were the professors 
W. Scharling (1837-1911), N.C. Frederiksen (1840-1905) and V. Falbe-Hansen 
(1841-1932). Niels Kærgaard has argued that C is identical with N.C. Frederiksen, 
because the review is characterised by his liberal views and style. 
29 Scharling (1837-1911) was appointed as professor at the Copenhagen University in 
1869. He was co-founder of the Economic Association and served as member of the 
editorial board from 1873 to 1900. He was used as advisor to the 1875-Commission 
on the conditions of the working class. 
30 When N.C. Frederiksen resigned from his chair it was taken over by Falbe-Hansen 
(1841-1932) who served as professor of economics until 1902. He was oriented to-
wards classical, liberal economics, and served frequently as an advisor to the govern-
ment. He was member of the Lower House for a short period in the 1880s elected as 
representative for the Right, but with close connections also to the Liberals. Since the 
political context made serious work on social and economic problems more or less 
impossible, he resigned as member in 1884. 
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Not least Bramsen’s work (1889c) influenced the discussion. The British 
Act on Relief Funds was seen as admirable based as it was on the interest of 
the population in its own affairs and its inclination and ability to help itself 
(Bramsen 1889c: 265). The German social insurance in case of sickness was 
far from having influenced the moral consciousness of the population in any 
ennobling manner. Simulated sickness was an everyday occurrence (Bramsen 
1889c: 293-295). 
 
We do not think that the German legislation is ugly, but it is not a legis-
lation that we envy…. but we can not avoid to praise Britain as a happy 
country because it has proved unnecessary to develop such legislation 
for working men, and in particular because the working population en-
ergetically would resist all endeavours to implement acts like the Ger-
man. 
(Bramsen 1889c: 318). 
 
During the first reading (Rigsdagstidende 1889/90, Landstingets Forhan-
dlinger: 194-252) on the second bill on approved sickness funds (Rigsdag-
stidende 1889/90, A: 1687-1704), Th. Nielsen31 praised voluntariness and 
referred to German experiences demonstrating partly that compulsion ran con-
trary to morality, and that the German sickness funds were expensive and bu-
reaucratic. 
 A few years later (Nogle oplysninger 1898) the Journal of the Sickness 
Insurance Funds saw it as “a blessing for the Danish population that we had 
not imitated Germany’s social legislation, but chosen our own way which did 
not expect everything to be called forth by compulsion and regulation from 
above. In Denmark the most is handed over to voluntariness and individuals’ 
own decisions.” It was a frequently voiced view in Danish debates that the 
                                                 
31 Thomas Nielsen (1838-1895) was teacher, but only 32 years of age he was elected 
in 1870 to the Lower House. The social issues were his speciality. He praised the “free 
competition” which had abolished the old corporative system of guilds and paved the 
way for individual initiative, but the time had come to introduce “a corrective”. He 
was strongly opposed to compulsory measures, but just as much opposed to economic 
liberalism. He worked strongly in favour of sickness and old age funds, and he de-
manded the support of the state. He was engaged in the endeavours to adopt the Act of 
old age relief and the Act on sickness insurance. He was seen as one of the most well-
informed parliamentarians on these questions.   
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German schemes were implemented “top-down” contrary to the Danish pref-
erence for decentralised anchoring built on a “bottom-up” political procedures. 
 The former secretary of the 1885-Commission, Julius Schovelin32 (1889), 
was the only one arguing against Bramsen’s views. Schovelin saw the eco-
nomic uncertainty of the workers as the core of “the labour question”, and the 
main objective was to remove this uncertainty. Therefore, one had to ask, 
which system of insurance best served this purpose: 
 
Which mean is the best, if all workers are to become members of sick-
ness funds? Incontestable: by compulsion. No, for Heavens sake, not by 
compulsion! Because compulsion means that we have to give up other 
important concerns. We will not educate the workers, strengthen their 
self-esteem and thrift, give them a feeling of moral responsibility etc. 
etc. But to these objections the simple answer is: No, my dear friends, 
we have to leave some concerns to the school, the church and the civil 
society. But if our core objective – to relieve all workers from economic 
uncertainty – is to be achieved, we must make use of compulsion. Why 
be anxious and troubled among many things, when one thing only is 
needful …. or are the workers – in order not to term them a “class” – 
best served by choosing between poor relief or starvation, when they 
become sick or old? Is the inclusion in a “class” that disgraceful, that it 
is better lo let sick workers suffer, cripples starve, old and children beg 
rather than obliging Messrs Liberalists to use such an ugly word … The 
German legislation is of utmost interest, because it represents an en-
deavour to implement an immediate solution to the problem in a country 
without a preceding development parallel to the British …. The necessi-
ty to act is caused by growing socialism. If Bramsen had seen that, he 
would have acknowledged the importance of the German social reform 
for our domestic problems. In Denmark as in Germany the trade unions 
are already tainted by socialism, they are already “vermoulu” [worm-
eaten]  (Schovelin 1889: 399-404). 
 
Even though German and Danish sickness insurance had to meet some of the 
same needs, they originated from different institutional contexts. The liberal 
trade Act in effect from 1862 opened for people’s efforts to associate for the 
purpose of mutual support in times of need. The sickness funds were marked 
                                                 
32 Julius Schovelin (1860-1933) was as a young economist working for the 1885-
Commission. He wrote a thorough description of the regulations and plans for devel-
oping of insurances in case of accidents at work. Politically, he strongly supported 
Estrup, and was opponent of the introduction of cabinet responsibility in 1901. He 
became the author of important works on economic history.  
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by a strong development and increasing number of members. A number of 
commissions had investigated possibilities for promoting this move by differ-
ent forms of public approval criteria to facilitate and guide the development 
which was seen as highly desirable. Voluntary sickness funds were seen as 
compliant with the dominant liberal ideology and promoting liberal views of 
educating workers to bonus pater familias behaviour. The basic objective of 
the commissions was to preserve and promote rather than to abrogate the vol-
untary impulse toward mutual support and protection.  
The German context was quiet different. People were used to obligatory 
membership of corporations, the rules and customs of which governed mutual 
support in case of sickness. During the 19th century government policy had 
asserted the supremacy of the State vis-à-vis the corporations by dismantling 
some and introducing other regulations and constraints. It naturally followed 
that the new German sickness insurance resorted to reshaping and extension of 
the existing compulsory institutions. Liberal ideas on voluntariness were mar-
ginal compared to Danish thinking. 
 
V.c Insurance in case of accidents 
 
The British historian E.P. Hennock (1987, 2007) shows that European debates 
on insurance in case of accidents were marked by the tension between a Ger-
man and a British model – the German elaborated in compliance with the 
German social insurance paradigm, the British representing employers’ liabil-
ity to pay compensation in case of accidents – the “social” versus the “liberal” 
principle. 
 When the German Act on social insurance in case of accidents was 
passed in 1884, Bramsen (1884) wrote a mordant criticism. Compulsory in-
surance was described as state socialism which would bring German capital 
“into villain service to the advantage of the pyramid of the Reich” (Bramsen 
1884: 26). Even though industrial development pointed towards collectivisa-
tion of risks, it was a mistake to collectivise responsibility. A collective insur-
ance arrangement was impersonal and mirrored guardianship that would de-
stroy responsibility and morality. The concern of the government had to be 
restricted to support the responsibility which personal relations ensured under 
patriarchal conditions, not to undermine that responsibility. Bramsen was well 
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aware of the new conditions called forth by industrialisation, and acknowl-
edged the implied, new understanding of risk. In 1882 the French radical poli-
tician Emile Cheysson defined professional risk – in the French usage, ‘théorie 
du risqué professionnel’ – as “…the risk assignable to an occupation which is 
ascertained independent of the fault of the worker or the patrons” (Rabinbach 
1996: 57). The blame for industrial injury should no longer be placed on indi-
vidual character but on the shared hazards of industrialization. Simultaneous-
ly, the same recognition of industrial risk prevailed in Germany, which among 
other factors led to the famous accident insurance law of 1884.  
Bramsen was a strong opponent of the German model, but supported the 
need to develop accident insurance, based on the new idea of professional risk. 
In his review of Bramsens work, Professor Harald Westergaard33 (1885) 
agreed with Bramsen on his critique of the “large apparatus” implemented in 
Germany, and his fear that a continuation along the chosen trajectory would 
be a slide leading far wider than desired. It would be better to have a “brief 
and accessible” Act and leave accident insurance to the private initiative, 
which in Denmark already had accomplished so much.34 
 When the 1885-Commission on insurance in case of accidents – partly 
inspired by the adoption of the German scheme – reported (Betænkning 1887), 
it was underlined that, contrary to the policy field of insurance on sickness that  
 
In this field we are not on historic ground. We have no associations of 
workers who have joined hands to ensure mutual protection in case of 
accidents, (Betænkning 1887: 71).  
 
                                                 
33 Harald Westergaard (1853-1936) was statistician and economist. As a student he 
served as statistician for the 1875-Commission on the conditions of the working class. 
After education he travelled in England and Germany and got in touch with people 
aware of the social misfortunes in the wake of a liberal economy: the christian social-
ists in England and the socialists of the chair – in particular Brentano – in Germany. 
He was – in cooperation with Marcus Rubin actively involved in paving the way for 
the Act on relief in old age. He served as a member of the 1885-Commission. In 1886 
he was appointed as professor at the Copenhagen University, but he continued to be 
strongly involved in all discussions on social matters. 
34 Westergaard in his review stated his intent to return to the problem in a future arti-
cle in the Journal of the Economic Association. He did not do that, probably because 
he was appointed as member of the 1885-Commission.  
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There were no reasons, therefore, to expect a solution of the problem based on 
voluntariness. The state had to build up an arrangement from the bottom, and 
the German model appeared applicable. The secretary of the Commission, 
Julius Schovelin, wrote: 
 
In principle the German Act relies on compulsory insurance. The pecu-
liarity of the Act is that workers who have been subject to an accident or 
their dependents are not secured by compensation claims against indi-
vidual employers according to the rules of civil law … but their com-
pensation follow from general norms, the cost of which is not carried by 
the single employer but by industry as such.  The view of public law is 
that industry itself has to carry all production costs including the premi-
um for risk of one’s life. Since society has a social interest in ensuring 
this to happen, because the invalids of work otherwise would be a bur-
den on the system of poor relief, the natural implication seems to be 
compulsory insurance established by public law (Schovelin 1887: 26-
27). 
 
The advantages were, so Schovelin stated, that insured workers were ensured 
the risk premium which social statisticians of the 1880s had demonstrated that 
the wage did not include. Moreover, the costs caused by provision for injured 
workers were accepted as production costs to be carried by employers in 
common. Finally, workers were ensured compensatory payments in all cases, 
by which “social peace” was maintained. 
 The Commission this way also acknowledged, that the new sociological 
understanding of risk confronted existing legal traditions. The private law in 
most European countries stated that an injured worker could only receive 
compensation, when individual fault could be placed on the employer (Mares 
2003, Moses 2009). The legal burden of proof lay with the worker, which 
made it difficult for him to be paid any compensation. A strong liberal belief 
in freedom of contract prevented workers from succeeding in expensive law-
suits against employers. According to Pat O’Malley, the European courts 
could hardly intervene in a situation when the contracting parties were sup-
posed to have allocated risks and benefits to their mutual acceptance 
(O’Malley 2004: 38). Whenever a worker agreed to work for a given salary, 
he accepted any risk connected to his occupation. Any hardships resulting 
from accidental injury were to be carried by the worker himself, mutual work-
ers associations, benevolent employers, private charity, or, in the end, the poor 
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law. As a result of this, accident insurance emerged as a political solution to 
legal problems as well as a social problem of provision (Andersen 2009). 
The Commission added two reservations only. Contrary to the German 
system, workers were entitled also to run civil proceedings, and they were not 
entitled to compensation if the accident was due to negligence on their part. 
The purpose of the latter was partly to ensure moral and preventive considera-
tions partly to put employers and workers on an equal footing so that the em-
ployer, too, could run civil proceedings against the worker. 
 So far all members of the Commission agreed on the need of a new legal 
framework to deal with “accidental” or “faultless” work accidents as well as 
the need for a compulsive scheme. But the majority – led by Harald 
Westergaard – argued in favour of a linkage between sickness insurance and 
accident insurance   – a view primarily motivated by a desire to give workers 
an incentive to join the sickness insurance funds. Insurance in case of acci-
dents, therefore, was perceived by the majority in a help to self-help perspec-
tive when aiming at needy members of health insurance societies in all occu-
pations. The minority – led by the social statistician and medical doctor, Th. 
Sørensen35 – argued that there were no reasons for such a linkage, and that a 
linkage neglected the new understanding of industrial professional risks, i.e. 
the idea that industrialization gave rise to higher accident frequency and statis-
tical regularity (Sørensen 1887a, 1887b).  Sørensen argued that compensation 
should be granted to workers mainly in dangerous industrial occupations. But 
then any industrial wageworker should be included in accident insurance and 
not only necessitous members of health insurance societies. Accident insur-
ance should focus on the relationship between worker and employer alone.  
 In October 1888 the government put forward a bill that in most respects 
followed the recommendations of the Commission. Ludvig Bramsen was not 
appointed, even though he was seen as an expert on the subject. Everybody 
knew that he was a strong critic of compulsory insurance, and the fact that he 
was not appointed suggests that the aim of the government was to avoid dis-
                                                 
35 Serving as GP in Hobro Th. Sørensen (1849-1929) began to study the living condi-
tions of workers in the towns and in the countryside followed by studies on frequen-
cies of accidents at work. Due to his studies he was a highly qualified member of the 
1885-Commission. When the Act on approved Sickness Funds had been adopted in 
1892, Th. Sørensen was appointed as the first inspector of the Health Insurance In-
spectorate. 
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cussions on compulsion versus voluntariness. The bill was met with some 
criticism outside the Parliament. The mathematician and Head of an insurance 
company, J.P. Gram36 (1888) saw the German inspiration as a weakness. The 
Commission (and the government) seemed to have been too much impressed 
by the German legislation and being without courage to replace German ideas 
with something else better suited to the domestic situation or possibly devel-
oping an arrangement based on voluntariness. The initiatives of the govern-
ment/state had to be restricted to develop overarching frames for private insur-
ance companies’ decisions on rules of liability and levels of benefits. The 
prominent jurist and later professor V. Bentzon37 (1890) argued that the Ger-
man principles were incompatible with existing Nordic principles of law re-
garding compensation and responsibility in case of bodily harm. Full security 
for the worker would dim morality, and if workers almost always were com-
pensated an insurance law was actually turned into a law on social provision. 
Advocate of the Supreme Court Herman Halkier38 (1890) agreed and argued 
in favour of a voluntary development of accident insurance.  
Bramsen (1889d) continued his previous criticism and argued in favour 
of a law which clarified employers’ individual liability for damages. 
 During the parliamentary debates cleavages within the Right were evi-
dent. The influential professor of law Carl Goos39 was sceptical concerning the 
principle of “industries’ compulsory self-help” and argued in favour of a link-
age to the bill on approved sickness associations so that the system would 
appear as an organic and harmonious whole, build on proper principles 
(Rigsdagstidende, 1888/89, Landstingets Forhandlinger: 125). This was the 
minimum demand, for acceptance of the German paradigm. The bill, neverthe-
                                                 
36 Gram (1850-1916) was the founder of the accident insurance company Skjold 
(1884/85) and served as its director until 1910. 
37 Viggo Bentzon (1961-1937) was professor of law at Copenhagen University 1892-
1930. He focused in his studies on harmonization of legislation in the Nordic coun-
tries. 
38 (1839-1915) 
39 Goos (1835-1917) was appointed as professor of law at Copenhagen University in 
1862. As legal scholar he strongly defended the interpretation of the Constitution as 
entitling the King to appoint his government. He was elected to the Lower House 
1880-84, and in 1885 he became appointed to the Upper House by the King. He gave 
unreserved support to the policy of Prime Minister Estrup. In the years 1891-1894 he 
served as Minister of Culture in the Estrup government. 
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less, was adopted by the Upper House. Presented to the Lower House in the 
following session the leader of the moderate Liberals (the farmers’ party), 
Frede Bojsen40 who was actively seeking reconciliation between the Right and 
the Liberals to end “the Constitutional struggle” acknowledged that in this 
policy area 
 
… social currents and influences have come to us from Germany and 
we can not avoid that what has broken new grounds in Germany will 
unavoidable influence conditions and public feelings in Denmark 
(Rigsdagstidende, 1890/91Folketingets Forhandlinger: 1187) 
 
Early in March 1891 –following efforts of obstruction – the Lower House was 
ready to adopt a reform package including the peculiar Danish tax financed 
scheme on old age relief – to a large extent seen as a genuine alternative to the 
German social insurance in case of invalidity and old age – and a “German” 
inspired accident insurance. 
 The political situation, however, was complicated. One fraction of the 
Liberals led by Christen Berg41 strongly opposed all endeavours of reconcilia-
tion between the government and the majority of the Lower House. To block 
the on-going negotiations on old age relief Berg in cooperation with the influ-
ential economist Marcus Rubin42 worked out an alternative put forward at the 
end of 1890, but they did not succeed – even though their initiative meant 
important changes in what was actually adopted, see Petersen (1985) for a 
                                                 
40 Bojsen (1841-1926) was theologian and strongly involved in the folk high school 
movement influenced as he was from the thinking of Grundtvig. He was elected to the 
Lower House in 1869. Early in his parliamentary career he acknowledged that cabinet 
responsibility could be introduced only through negotiations, but it had to last until 
1890 before he stepped forward as leader of the group of Liberals seeking reconcilia-
tion with the Right – the centre of reconciliation being social legislation. 
41 Christen Berg (1829-1891) was elected to the Lower House in 1865. He was the 
leader of the Liberals and strongly committed to the original 1849-Constitution. He 
declined all efforts to seek reconciliation between the parties unconditionally demand-
ing cabinet responsibility. Therefore, he did what was possible to obstruct Bojsen’s 
endeavour to compromise with the Right.  
42 Marcus Rubin (1854-1923) was influential economist, statistician, historian and 
civil servant. In cooperation with Harald Westergaard he did a number of studies in 
the 1880s pointing towards social legislation. Rubin was skeptical regarding the “ab-
stractions of the classical economic doctrine” as well as the influences from German 
economic theory. He went his own way. 
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thorough analysis of the events. Berg was more successful, however, in block-
ing the bill on accident insurance. In cooperation with Bramsen he worked out 
a proposal put forward as a bill on March the 12. 1891, a proposal which made 
compulsion and stately administration superfluous, promoted the sense of 
responsibility among individuals and authorities, and included everybody 
(Andersen 2006: 71). Whereas the Berg-Rubin initiative actually served as a 
catalyst for the reconciliation between the Right and the “negotiating Liber-
als”, the Berg-Bramsen bill, an effort of obstruction, was crowned with suc-
cess. The Minister of the Interior tried to brush the bill aside by identifying the 
proposal only with Berg, i.e. by trying to describe the proposal as a party po-
litical manoeuvring arguing that Bramsen – a highly respected expert – would 
hardly be able to recognize his own thinking and ideas in the proposal. The 
minister did not succeed, because Bramsen declared in public that he willingly 
appropriated the credit for having elaborated the proposal which he described 
as “… a great and important thought and a genuine basis for a true social re-
form …” (Andersen 2006: 73). Even though the proposal was turned down in 
parliament the government’s bill did not come to a third reading in the session 
1890/91, and when it was put on the agenda in the subsequent session, the bill 
stranded in the parliamentary committee. “The German inspired” bill was 
taken as hostage in the parliamentary stride, and actually the hostage was 
killed. Bramsen managed to frame the german model as a negative foil, and 
apparantly sceptical supporters of the government bill now turned against it. 
The Commission of 1885 and the conservative government perceived the 
German model as a proper way to address the workers question. But they had 
underestimated the deeper sentiments of many politicians of both sides. On the 
other hand, Bramsens bill did not pass either – rather a period of stalemate 
occurred.   
When the issue of accident insurance reappeared at the parliamentary 
agenda in 1895 Bramsen was a very influential parliamentarian, and the end 
result was the adoption of the liberal model – not the German paradigm. How-
ever, strictly party political struggles once more threatened to obstruct the 
passing of an accident insurance. Especially when moderate liberals ques-
tioned the role of Bramsen as social expert, now being a conservative Member 
of Parliament. Even the conservative government re-endorsed their old bill, 
merely to downsize any scheme at all. To cut through party “squabbles” 
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Bramsen this time campaigned for his project, now armed with the latest 
German accident statistics of 1895. Bramsen showed that the frequency of 
industrial accidents in Germany and Austria had more than doubled in 10 
years and that the expenses were skyrocketing (Bramsen 1896: 1276-1278).   
Now, Bramsen argued, there was statistical evidence of the disadvanta-
geous nature of the german precedent, The german model subverted responsi-
bility among workers as well as employers. These new statistics finally broke 
the stalemate on accident insurance and spurred an unprecedented sudden 
strong political effort to actually pass a law (and not just prevent one) to com-
pensate workers. The assumption was that individual employer liability with 
freedom of risk management in fact would induce the employers to undertake 
measures of accident prevention (Rigsdagstidende 1896-97, Tillæg B: 961-
972). 
 Not only did Bramsen succeed in framing the german model as a “nega-
tive foil”. He also made the liberal model a positive one. But not as a clear cut 
“negative lesson” drawn from german experience, as no one actually knew, 
whether the increasing number of accidents resulted from growing negligence, 
or, as german experts stated, from a greater propensity of workers to claim 
their rights (Hennock 1987: 65ff). But clearly, the statistics fuelled the already 
present political anxieties towards the german model. 43  According to scholars 
like E. P. Hennock (1987: 63-79), Anson Rabinbach (1996: 64), and Janet 
Horne (2002: 204-208) this ideological reading of the German statistics also 
contributed to the final victory of the liberal model in France and Great Britain 
in the late 1890s.  
 
 
VI. Administrative considerations 
 
The Danish debates mirrored reluctance against “a large administrative ma-
chinery” probably reflecting the acknowledgement that Danish administrative 
capacities were not on a par with the German. State- and administrative capac-
ities played a role. 
                                                 
43 Prominent Danish social experts, as the earlier mentioned Cordt Trap (1902), were 
in fact not alarmed by the german statistics. They turned out to be much more ambiva-
lent than politicians and the public opinion (Andersen 2006: 97-110). 
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 As mentioned above professor Carl Goos had at the meeting of the Right 
in 1888 (Beretning 1889) described the German model as mirroring “a lot of 
duress and much art”. This was a view met again and again in Danish discus-
sions. When Berg and Hørup44 put forward their proposal (to block the en-
deavours of reconciliation, see above), Hørup (Rigsdagstidende 1890/91, Fol-
ketingets Forhandlinger: 1611-1622) in his presentation rejected the German 
counterpart as build on unacceptable compulsion, insufficient benefits and its 
“discouraging and circumstantial machinery and administration”. In Denmark 
it was so discouraging that proposals along German lines were unthinkable. 
 Presenting his ideas on a tax financed old age pension to the public Mar-
cus Rubin (Beretning om forhandlingerne … 1889) criticized the German 
scheme’s comprehensive “apparatus” and complicated entry system, and ret-
rospectively he wrote about the “creaking, German corporative, compulsory 
and controlling apparatus” (Rubin 1911: 245). Similarly Bramsen (1889a) 
talked about this “giant organisation” foreign to Danish way of thinking, Dan-
ish Constitution and sentiments voiced by government and parliament regard-
ing relief in old age. It was an advantage of Rubin’s proposal that the admin-
istration would be negligible, in particular if it was placed with the municipali-
ties. 
 Niels Neergaard45 – later Prime Minister, but in 1890/91 expert on social 
policy and advisor to the negotiating Liberals – refused to consider the idea of 
                                                 
44 Even though Viggo Hørup (1841-1902) was educated in law he won his reputation 
as writer and journalist. Hørup worked hard to win the intelligentsia for the Liberals 
arguing with the Brandes brothers for modernization of Danish society. In the period 
around Bojsen’s endeavours to seek reconciliation Hørup reentered his cooperation 
with Berg combating Bojsen’s efforts. 
45 Niels Neergard (1854-1936) was historian and as a young man he traveled in Ger-
many and England making himself familiar with economic and social questions of the 
day. He was particularly interested in the new efforts to change the conditions of the 
working class, and he worked within the Liberals to promote social reforms. He was 
elected to the Lower House in 1887, but lost his seat in 1890. He continued his coop-
eration with Bojsen and Klaus Berntsen and influenced their thinking on provision in 
old age and other social issues. He strongly pushed the Liberals to work out a more 
systematic “social program”. Later he became a very influential member of the Liber-
als, and it was during his period as Prime Minister 1920-1924 that the first really 
“modern” reform of social policy, including the enactment on provision in case of 
invalidity and the principle of “rights” was adopted. 
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importing the German paradigm partly because of its formal, administrative 
machinery: 
 
What a number of new civil servants would not be needed if we had to 
introduce this creaking machinery based on individual insurance ac-
counts for every worker and humble person in the country, with control,  
distraint, wage classes etc. etc. A system being that complicated can on-
ly be thought out in the brains of German professors and bureaucrats 
(Neergaard 1890).46  
 
 In a discussion some years later on a possible replacement of the discre-
tionary benefit determination by fixed benefits or at least minimum or maxi-
                                                 
46 Similar views were voiced in Britain during the debates on “Workmen (compensa-
tion for accidents) Bill” in May 1897. During the debate in the House of Commons, 
Joseph Chamberlain said: “It is quiet true …that there (i.e. in Germany] the insurance 
is paid not by individual employers, but by an association of employers [Berufsgenos-
senschaften] formed for the purpose. The association can exercise a certain control 
over its individual members … But … in this country it would [not] be possible, or, if 
possible, it would [not] be desirable, to force anybody in a particular trade into an 
association of this kind. The elaboration of the system, its bureaucratic tendency, and 
the arbitrary interference of officials are all matters which are so objectionable to 
English people … that I believe it is absolutely impossible and absolutely impractica-
ble to attempt any system of operations of that kind ….” (HC Deb 03 May 1897 vol 
48 cc1467). Later the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Matthew Ridley, 
said: “[Nobody hardly expects] that the government could have proposed a scheme of 
compulsory trade responsibility or insurance. Anyone who has studied the details of 
the German system will feel that it could never be introduced into this country …. and 
such arrangements made voluntarily, as is the custom in this country, will be far more 
effective and economical and in accordance with English feeling than any compulsory 
system” ((HC Deb 17 May 1897 vol 49 cc699-700). During the same debate H.H. 
Asquith said: “The German system may be very well suited to the economic and so-
cial conditions of that country, but its adoption here – resting as it does on the double 
foundation of compulsory grouping and centralised control – would require us to fry 
in the face of the traditions and the living tendencies of British industry. [Cheers.] I 
thought that the Government were perfectly right in discarding that feature of the 
German system, although it must be admitted that in so doing they have been obliged 
to deprive the workman of a security which, under the German system, he does un-
doubtedly enjoy. Let us see how it works out. It is said that under this Bill the em-
ployers will insure. I believe that in a large number of cases they will, though there is 
no obligation to do so” (HC Deb 18 May 1897 vol 49 cc750). These British comments 
are quiet similar to views frequently voiced in Denmark. 
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mum benefit levels, the later Prime Minister Klaus Berntsen47 warned against 
abolishing discretion because in that case we have to develop a large machin-
ery of civil servants like the one in Germany (Rigsdagstidende 1896/97, Fol-
ketingets Forhandlinger: 935-36). 
VII. Other arguments 
 
In compliance with Brentano’s arguments it was underlined that a compulsory 
contribution (to an old age insurance) would serve as an income tax to be paid 
also in case of unemployment and sickness. If the individual could not pay 
either the future benefit would be reduced or special regulations had to be set 
up exempting contributory payments in such cases. But if so the costs would 
be shifted to other workers, but this was unacceptable from a distributional 
point of view. Speaking in favour of the Berg-Rubin proposal, Viggo Hørup 
(Rigsdagstidende 1890/91, Folketingets Forhandlinger: 1771-1772) rejected 
contributory payments because the right to work was not guaranteed. 
 Another important criticism of the German paradigm was its limitation of 
coverage to workers. The reluctance to “class based” legislation was strong 
partly because coverage based on social class or occupational status was in-
compatible with the structure of the agricultural workforce covering landless 
labourers, cottars and small holders. The double role of cottars and smallhold-
ers as both independents and farmhands made attempts to distinguish between 
dependently employed and independents impossible. Rubin (Beretning om 
forhandlingerne ..1889: 36) strongly criticized the German use of social clas-
ses – alternatively arguing in favour of a criterion mirroring “lack of re-
sources”. Bramsen similarly saw classifications based on social class as being 
at variance with the Constitution. At a party meeting in 1890 the Right argued 
against use of social class as a basis because of social mobility across classes. 
 The German model also was criticized, because the public purse was laid 
under an obligation for an unlimited time –a trajectory from which retreat was 
impossible. Bramsen as well as Neergaard expressed concern with the huge 
                                                 
47 Klaus Berntsen (1844-1927) was the third in the triumvirate of Bojsen, Neergaard 
and Berntsen. Bojsen was the one ensuring cooperation with the Right, Neergaard the 
man of ideas and Berntsen the one who kept the group of “moderate Liberals” togeth-
er. He was member of the Lower House 1873-1884 and 1886-1926, Prime Minister 
1910-1913. 
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capital accumulation of the state. This concern was also voiced at a meeting in 
the Economic Association (Tvermoes 1884). 
 Several contributors to the Danish debate voiced concern about the Ger-
man decisions “from above” preferring the Danish “bottom up”-procedure. 
 
 
 
 
VIII. Subsequent Danish evaluations 
 
Bramsen (1892) noted that the Act on old age relief “untied the knot” in such 
a peculiar manner that knowledge about the conditions abroad or even the 
previous Danish discussion was unnecessary to an understanding of the 1891-
Act. Years later The Journal of Workers Insurance (Trier 1905/06) endorsed 
this view. In a public lecture the outstanding representative of the sickness 
insurance associations, Vilhelm Munck (Sognerådstidende 1891) pointed to 
the peculiar Danish development – not least compared to the German: “We 
have chosen our own trajectory not formed after a pattern”. He saw the 1891-
Act as placed “equidistantly from the strict German system in which the state 
governs from above, and the praiseworthy British development where workers 
do not want the support of the state but develop suitable institutional forms on 
their own”. The outstanding economist Harald Westergaard (1915) who was 
actively involved in the debates on social policy noted that “the simple (com-
pared to the German paradigm) solution” was more in compliance with Dan-
ish national character. 
 In 1897 the Journal of the Sickness Insurance Associations wrote that 
Denmark had entered a real peculiar developmental trajectory by the adoption 
of the Act on approved sickness associations in general and the Act on old age 
relief in particular. It has been said that no counterparts exist in the legislation 
of other countries, and it is gratifying that this small country has chosen its 
own path instead of imitating others. The journal added that “comparison be-
tween the German and Danish sickness insurance turned out to the advantage 
of the mother country”. In Germany the compulsory elements were continu-
ously strengthened –the government dominating and pushing the sickness 
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funds around, while the sickness funds in Denmark had an extreme freedom 
supported by governmental guidance and support. 
  
IX. Policy transfer of a key concept? 
 
In his classic history on the State and poverty professor Kjeld Philip (1947: 
71-72) argued that “nothing suggests that Bismarck’s policy influenced Dan-
ish social policy in the 1890s to any appreciable extent”. The Danish acts mir-
rored the preceding development founded on Danish traditions, and none of 
Bismarck’s ideas were taken over. In another classical analysis professor 
Jørgen Dich (1962: 36 and 40) restricts himself to argue that the development 
in Germany possibly played a role, and that the appointment of the 1885-
Commission possibly was inspired by the German 1884-Act on accident in-
surance. Philip’s view is endorsed by Kuhnle (1981), but it represents a truth 
with important qualifications.  
It is true that none of the German ideas were taken over, but the German 
ideas were an ingredient part of the Danish debate, but served mainly as nega-
tive foil for efforts to develop a particular Danish pattern complying with Dan-
ish traditions, legacies, self-knowledge, “national character”, and ideology –
implying efforts to develop a peculiar trajectory strengthening community 
building in the wake of the traumatic loss of the northern part of Schleswig. It 
has not much to do with “negative lesson drawing” in the sense of watching 
perceived mistakes of others. Rather the procedure chosen by Germany was 
used as a model not to be followed – a scare image. 
 Policy transfer – in the form of a scare image exemplified by Germany – 
took place at the national level. The key actors involved were partly politi-
cians, experts, experts being also politicians and some politicians who had 
attained expert status in the field of social legislation. The object of (negative) 
transfer was a specified program – the German “social insurance paradigm” –, 
its administrative technique and the implied policy goal embedded in an ide-
ology of the State. As far as the degree of transfer is concerned one might 
argue that “inspiration” was working – at least with regard to the appointment 
of the 1885-Commission. Policy transference – though in a negative format – 
was motivated by the fact that the two countries both faced the “labour ques-
tion”, but the question was understood in different manners. In Germany, so 
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the Danish arguments, efforts focused on enhancing the power of the Imperial 
government by giving the State a providing role, thus repressing the workers’ 
movement by making workers dependent on the State. The idea of repression 
was not completely absent from Danish thinking, but it was a side motive 
only, and the State was primarily seen as a protector of individual freedom. 
Whereas German thinking stressed the supremacy to the point of idolizing the 
State, Danish ideas pointed to the State as an instrument for promoting wel-
fare. The focus in Denmark was removal of specified categories of deserving 
poor from the operation of the poor law. German efforts aimed at Reich-
building, while in Denmark endeavours to develop social legislation partly 
served to improve the conditions of farm hands with improvement of the eco-
nomic conditions of the farmers in mind and partly served as a means in build-
ing national identity. The German “social insurance paradigm” was initiated 
by the State for the State, while Danish initiatives were called forth by a de-
mand from the dominant group of the farmers in combination with a desire to 
end the parliamentary deadlock through reconciliation between the parties 
catalysed by a wish to cope with the “labour question”. 
 Lessons from Germany were drawn in a highly selective manner. This is 
primarily seen from the bias in the presentation of German ideas in the Eco-
nomic Journal of the Economic Association editorially dominated by profes-
sors of economics firmly anchored in teaching of classical economic liberal-
ism. Most of the experts taking part in debates on social policies were strongly 
involved with the Economic Association, and to some extent the argumenta-
tion of the politicians echoed arguments of the expert economists. German 
thinking was identified with “state socialism” in contrast to the liberal minded 
Danish debate. 
 Only in case of accident insurance, it looked as if the idea of compulsory 
insurance was accepted because accident insurance represented a policy field 
in which no tradition and legacy existed. The opponent of compulsion Ludvig 
Bramsen was left out of the 1885-Commission, the Commission’s proposal 
was built along German lines, and it was followed by the government’s bills 
on accident insurance. This notwithstanding Bramsen and Berg succeeded in 
obstructing the plans by postponing decisions. 
 At least some Danish actors were willing to accept compulsory insurance 
in this field due to lack of precedence. Benevolent employers and private in-
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surance companies only scantily alleviated the social problems following ac-
cidents. And prior to the german model, no sufficient way of addressing the 
fundamental legal problems with “injuries without individual fault” existed. In 
the fields of protection in old age and sickness, on the other hand, continuity, 
gradual development and “organic growth bottom up” were strongly empha-
sised: 
 
We are developing the existing societal structure without precluding op-
tions for future changes if the outcome of some decisions should prove 
less beneficial, and we can do that without resorting to “other systems” 
or a complete rearrangement. I assume that what is used and known by 
the population is the high road appreciated by the population as an al-
ternative to the otherwise needed development of a large apparatus of 
civil servants (Rigsdagstidende 1890/91, Folketingets Forhandlinger: 
4545). 
 
Despite the peculiarity of the “Danish solution” it was understood as anchored 
in historical continuity built as it was on existing institutions with which the 
population was familiar. No new apparatus, no new administration was set up. 
The “solution” was founded in old, used and known practices – a new seed on 
the social organism which as time went on would develop according to its 
needs. This understanding is deeply embedded in “Danish national character” 
and to some extent it explains why the “German system” was used as scare-
image. Even though the “great architecture” of the Germans was mentioned, it 
was counteracted by a basically different understanding of what politics was 
about. A good illustration is the view of Niels Neergaard in an interview 
(Arnskov 1914) that the basis of his political work was the consciousness that 
“development was determined by nature, protracted and long-winded”, re-
sistance against forcing progress beyond what the population was willing to 
accept, efforts to keep the objective in mind, but to accept the small steps, if 
time was not ripe for the larger ones. Harald Westergaard (1915) argued along 
similar lines writing that “the simple Danish solution” was better correspond-
ing with (than was the complicated German one) Danish “national character”. 
In a Danish context “great architectural achievements” imposed from above 
must give way for “organic growth” implemented “bottom up”. 
 Past policies, political legacies, different views on the role of the State, 
different State capacities, different ideologies, negative attitudes towards 
35 
Germany etc. explain why Kjeld Philip concluded that “nothing suggests that 
Bismarck’s policy influenced Danish social policy in the 1890s to any appre-
ciable extent”. As it has been demonstrated in this contribution Danish debates 
on social policies during its formative years was strongly influenced by Ger-
man thinking, but the German set up served not as a model to be imitated or 
domesticated in one way or another. On the contrary, it served as the negative 
foil for Danish efforts to develop a Danish trajectory firmly anchored in the 
Danish past, as a scare-image to be avoided – not because of its “failure” in a 
German context, but because of its unfamiliarity to a small people in a small 
peripheral state strongly – and perhaps having an exaggerated opinion of itself 
– seeking its own national identity. 
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